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REFORMING CAPITALISM THROUGH LAW
AND REGULATION
RICHARD DELGADO 1
I. INTRODUCTION: RECENT WRITING ON LAW REFORM.
Reflecting on a number of recent books on social reform
through law, it struck me how many of them exhibit a common
structure.2 The books lay out in the first half how poorly a certain
sector, such as corporate finance,3 immigration, 4 or civil rights, 6
has been performing under certain criteria, usually justice or
efficiency. They then argue for changing ineffective laws or
passing new ones that will enable the flawed sector to operate
more effectively. Often these proposals take the form of heightened
regulatory oversight to reduce self-dealing, conflict of interest, or
inconsistent application of the rules.6 A few authors go further and
propose changes that would redistribute the social benefits of a
sector to groups, like consumers, small shareholders, or
immigrants, that now receive too few of them.7 This common
structure also explains why this approach, although appealing, is
1 John J. Sparkman Chair of Law, University of Alabama. Thanks to Jean
Stefancic and Katya Assafe for comments and suggestions.
2 This article grew out of talk at a panel critiquing capitalism at the 2013
Lat-Crit annual meeting in Chicago, IL. Other panelists included Katya
Assaf, Steve Ramirez, and Emma Coleman Jordan, all addressing different
aspects of our corporate capitalist system. The talk and this paper grew out of
a longer project. See generally Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Equation: Race,
Capitalism, and the Search for Reform, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 87
(discussing the reform of civil rights law in the context of recent books on
capitalism, immigration and racial equality).
3 See, e.g., STEVE RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS
AND THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW 1-16, 47-73 (2013) (discussing
the faults in the corporate structure stemming in part from the corruption of
powerful corporate elites).
4 See, e.g., KEVIN JOHNSON & BERNARD TRUJILLO, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
THE U.S.-MExICAN BORDER: SI SE PUEDE? (2010) (asserting that our
immigration laws play a large role in racial inequalities).
5 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 9-71 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the role the Courts as well as
Congress and the executive branch played in key civil rights matters).
6 See RAMIREZ, supra note 3, at 47-184 (explaining generally how the
previous lack of regulatory oversight and corruption contributed greatly to the
economic crisis).
7 See, e.g., JOHNSON & TRUJILLO, supra note 4, at 141-85 (suggesting
liberalizing border policy and enforcement).
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flawed.
Each of these areas - financial regulation, immigration policy
and civil rights - lie close to the heart of our corporate capitalist
system of social organization. Prescriptions like those mentioned
above-better monitoring, closer regulation, in short, more law -
are category mistakes, destined to disappoint for the simple reason
that, in our system, law and capitalism are the same thing.8 Law
cannot regulate corporate capitalism or any central feature of it
because this would amount to a thing regulating itself. The same
holds true for our immigration system: it regulates the very shape
and make-up of the American nation, and a nation is extremely
unlikely to regulate itself out of existence.
I discuss this thesis in a recently-published article9 that
commends a number of recent books, but deems them valiant
failures. Law reform is not a promising path for restructuring any
of the features that are central to the corporate-capitalist system,
because the two - law and capitalism - are the same thing. Thus,
asking whether something can regulate itself is like asking what
color a symphony is or whether the number seven has an
enthusiastic personality - they are not the kind of things that can
do that. 10
Some of the authors and I have engaged in lively exchanges
and are still on speaking terms. I even gave one of their books an
enthusiastic blurb, which the author's publicist liked so much she
put it on the back cover. Please buy these books - they call
attention to problems that require attention, even if not, I contend,
through law.
I discuss reform of the financial system a little later. But my
thesis holds true for immigration policy, as well, because it, too,
deals with the basic make-up of the American state. As a system
of law, it is shot through and through with capitalist ideas,
policies, images, and principles and, as such, is unsusceptible to
basic reform through that means, i.e., more law.11 We have even
enacted a formal policy, called the plenary power doctrine,12 to
8 A few books in the area of civil rights assume the appropriate degree of
skepticism. See ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 106 (doubting that civil rights
reform through law has yielded vast changes); DERRICK BELL JR., AND WE
ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 57-74 (1987)
(noting how the courts were largely ineffective at creating law that fostered
actual racial reform).
9 Delgado, supra note 2 (arguing that regulations alone will not be able to
reform the current system).
10 This is what I meant earlier by a category mistake-attributing a
quality or ability to a thing that cannot possibly exhibit it. See supra notes 7-8
and accompanying text.
11 For example: labor preferences; prohibitions against paupers and those
without the ability to support themselves; provisions allowing wealthy
investors to earn green cards with relative ease, etc.
12 See Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (establishing
extreme judicial deference to Congress and the executive branch on
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make sure that any reform-minded court inclined to change things
minds its own business.
Congress alone can change substantive immigration law and
policy, and when it does, it keeps a weather eye on labor and
economic needs, wartime exigencies, and which groups are
currently in favor or disfavor, culturally speaking. 13 Reform in this
area never comes or lasts long unless it also benefits a key sector
of the corporate-capitalist economic system or national security or
caters to a currently noisy group of nativists - in which case, the
change doesn't amount to reform, any more than seven amounts to
yellow. It represents the system defending and replicating itself -
acting in its own self-interest, in short. 14
Much the same is true of civil rights, for the very reasons
Derrick Bell wrote about in his Brown v, Board of Education and
the Interest-Convergence Dilemma article.15 Civil rights law does
not change because of evolving notions of decency. Rather, it
changes because decision-makers in high places decide it is in the
national interest.16 The changes, when they arrive, do not last for
very long. 7
My equation - law equals capitalism and vice versa - is an
interpretive principle, the main value of which lies in explaining
the past and predicting the future. It tells you what is likely to
work and what not. It does not assert a fact, but might enable you
to place the facts in perspective and explain them more simply
than other ways are likely to.
Thus, the closer one's target is to the central arenas of
corporate power, the less likely an instrument the law will be to
achieve reform. In short, we should look somewhere else. Reform
is possible, just not through law.18
The books themselves provide an argument for my position.
They each begin by contextualizing things - by going back many
decades or centuries, reviewing all the previous efforts to make
immigration, financial regulation, or civil rights work better. 19
immigration matters).
13 At different times, Japanese were decidedly out of favor; another time,
Chinese; another time, Mexicans; another time, Muslims and Arabs; and so
forth.
14 See generally Derrick Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (discussing civil
rights after the Brown decision and what can be done to move racial equality
forward now).
16 Id. at 524-28.
17 Id.
18 Other means include interest convergences, resistance, marching and
street demonstrations, and voting.
19 See generally RAMIREZ, supra note 3 (detailing the mistakes, blind
alleys, and other defects of our system of corporate capitalism); JOHNSON &
TRUJILLO, supra note 4 (dealing with the history, the laws and regulations
currently in effect, and offering new ideas for reform in the context of
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After concluding that earlier efforts did not work, the authors go
on to make another such proposal. It is usually a revision of the
applicable law, carefully differentiating the new measure from the
earlier ones that did not work and sometimes calling them models
or paradigms. 20
Astute readers might notice that the first half of these articles
and books make a case for the opposite of what the authors are
proposing. The first half proves, instead, what statisticians call a
null hypothesis - that nothing will work, nothing of the legal kind,
that is. After all, if ninety-nine efforts at reforming area X by a
certain means - law reform - have not worked, except perhaps for
a very short time and under circumstances that make plain that
change was coming anyway, how much faith would a reasonable
person, a Martian say, place in that approach the hundredth time?
Still, we plow ahead, telling ourselves that our exact method
or model has never been tried. Who knows, maybe it will work this
time? Besides, our tenure committee expects a normative article
from us from time to time, weighing the values and virtues of this
model or that and proposing a new one that will avoid the shoals of
Xor Y.
Pierre Schlag wrote about this approach years ago in an
article entitled Normative and Nowhere to Go. 21 I am proposing a
theory for why the standard approach - propose and pass a new
law - goes nowhere.
I also offer a psychological mechanism-perseveration-that
explains the attraction of the familiar law-reform approach that
tries to reform the un-reformable via yet another law-that is, via
itself. Consider the dynamics of a certain type of perseveration
called cargo cults.
As you might know, anthropologists write about two types of
cargo cult. Chinua Achebe, the postcolonial scholar and author of
Things Fall Apart, did, too. 22 In the best known form, South Sea
Islanders notice that one day an invading army that has been
camping out on their island, usually without permission, has
suddenly departed, leaving behind quantities of goods of great
interest to the natives. These goods include containers of GI food,
cans of fresh water, tents, jeeps, airplane fuel, and even a few
weapons. Seeing no one around to claim them, the natives help
themselves and feel much better.
A few months later, they learn that the same thing happened
immigration).
20 E.g., RAMIREZ, supra note 3 (positing that corporate reform would really,
finally work if only we tried A and B); JOHNSON & TRUJILLO, supra note 4
(discussing how the immigration system would be more rational if only we
stopped doing Z and changed the rules relating to C and D).
21 Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L REV. 167
(1990).
22 CHINtUA ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA 9 (1984).
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at another island 500 miles away and start praying and chanting
for another visit from the gods - which, of course, never arrives,
since the war is moving in another direction. So, they pray harder
and dance and chant more fervently since the last time, the gods
were so generous to them. Not knowing what brought the great
boon, they believe it could happen again, if only they wished for it
hard enough or did what they had been doing - praying and
conducting rituals - more and more fervently.
In a second version, a down-on-its luck coastal village in a
windswept part of Ireland or Wales hears that a cargo ship has
foundered on some rocks offshore and is sinking. The villagers
rush to the shore to recover the barrels of flour, cargo from the
hold, and ship's furniture that they know the tide will bring in
soon. They may ignore the cries of the drowning crew, since
rescuing them would raise troubling questions about ownership of
the loot.
Those of us who write about law reform should be careful not
to become ensnared in cargo cult scholarship. Something that did
not work yesterday, last month, last year, or the year before last,
will probably not work again. Some mechanism may be accounting
for it unbeknownst to us.
If, in fact, Brown II is not just around the corner, we should,
perhaps, stop hoping for that and start a campaign of an entirely
different type. Perhaps the islanders should learn to tend a garden
or open a furniture factory; maybe we should too. Possibly the
coastal village in the godforsaken region should put a lighthouse
on those rocks and get on with more remunerative work, perhaps
in the tourist industry. (Tourists love scenic things like
lighthouses and windswept beaches.)
Our people, after all, are hungry for change. We are the
educated class. So, why do we repeat the same form of scholarship
that we wrote last year, asking the gods on the Supreme Court or
legislature to intervene? Perhaps it's because it is familiar and
makes us feel good, not noticing what happened last time -
namely, nothing. Please tell me if I'm mistaken.
I will end this essay by suggesting that we devote some
attention to the forces that produce the type of dismal paralysis
that we see around us and pay some to how the corporate
capitalist system replicates itself, year after year, despite our best
efforts at reforming it. The common law has a very high opinion of
itself. It believes it is becoming fairer, more just, and more
efficient over time. This may be true in a few areas such as tort
law, but the same is not true in areas that come close to the core of
our system of corporate capitalism, where we seem to be actually
getting worse - that is, more unfair, more entrenched, and more
unequal over time.
That system functions as though it possesses an inner DNA
that reproduces itself over and over, or an immune system that
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recognizes a foreign body that is trying to invade it so as to repel it
unerringly. But this is an immune system in reverse. With a
healthy body, the immune system rejects agents that will make it
sick. With our system, a sick system rejects the medications, your
proposals and mine, that can make it healthy - that is, fairer and
with workers who work with a will, who receive a fair share of the
benefits of their work, who find their lives creative and fulfilling,
and are not constantly insecure - while the one percent of moguls
get richer and richer and working conditions worse and worse for
the other ninety-nine percent. Wouldn't it be nice to know how
this happens?
A book by Steve Ramirez, to its great credit, begins the work
of outlining how this immune system works. 2 3 Regulatory capture
is one such mechanism, in which the financial industry, the focus
of his book, for example, has become so complex and hard to
understand that the only person who could possibly have the
knowledge necessary to serve in a regulatory role is one who
formerly worked in that industry, like Robert Rubin. 24 But then,
that person would undoubtedly have a world view, set of attitudes
and perspectives, and taken-for-granted ways of seeing the world
of complex derivatives and other financial instruments that
virtually assure that the world will go on much as it always has.
My equation at work.
Ramirez mentions, as well, how those at the top of corporate
or financial empires use part of their wealth to purchase political
influence, thus assuring that reformers like him and maybe you,
too, achieve little purchase besides an occasional invitation to
serve on an advisory panel somewhere or give a talk at a
conference on reform of the area of X.25 I would add that the very
foundations of capitalism - its laws and legal structure - like an
immune system, recognize and reject any attempt to change the
system in any significant way.
Might it make sense for us to look at how all these
homeostatic mechanisms work together to assure and protect
corporate capitalism and subsidiary systems essential for its
operation? Otherwise, we are little better than leaders of a cargo
cult keeping the natives happy with false hopes and mystical
language - in short, the equation.
23 RAMIREZ, supra note 3 (attempting to create a theory that would allow
people to increase their economic opportunity).
24 Id. at xvi-xvii, 5, 15, 37, 35-36, 40-41,68-69, 95, 98-99, 195 (discussing
regulatory capture).
25 Id. at xiv, 33, 65, 72-73, 79, 102-03 (discussing the role of lobbyists and
PACs).
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